President Jacob Zuma may have used the wrong footwork when defending himself to supporters in KwaDukuza, writes Dumisani Hlophe.
President Jacob Zuma’s rural-based fight-back campaign against the urban-based middle class might inadvertently position the ANC as a rural political party.
In retreating from critical urban middle-class constituencies, not only has Zuma distanced himself from this constituency, but also from the institutions this class uses: the media, and the judiciary.
Thus, as part of his defence, he decried opposition parties and interest groups for constantly seeking solace from the courts from what may be predominantly political disputes.
However, most of these disputes are actually disputes arising out of flawed governance decisions.
So, when the president said, on the matter of Nkandla, “I did nothing wrong, but paid because the law determined as such”, it not only cast aspersions on those urban middle class groupings that initiated the process, but also on the process and its outcome. Now, this is the danger of a leadership that distances itself from one particular dominant class in society.
Criticism against Zuma has intensified in the last few months, mainly driven by some in the middle class, through the mainstream media. The sudden upsurge of the ANC veterans critical of Zuma has hit a raw nerve with the president.
Former public protector Thuli Madonsela’s State of Capture Report, and the National Prosecuting Authority’s stillborn charges against Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan have served as a catalyst for calls for Zuma to step down. These episodes have given rise to loose groupings such as the Save South Africa movement, whose mission is to dethrone Zuma.
In responding to this onslaught, Zuma had three options: the first would have been to give in and resign. The ANC’s secretary-general Gwede Mantashe suggested an exit route by arguing that the calls for Zuma to go, are calls to his conscience, and not to the ANC to fire him. Clearly, Zuma discarded this option.
The second option was to respond as a statesman. That is, rise to the occasion, live up to the leadership and statesmanship associated with the position of the executive head of state. In this regard, rise above differences, and position himself as a unifier.
In this option, Zuma could have extended an olive branch to his detractors, the veterans, in particular, and stalwarts of the movement.
Strategically, he could have played a unifying gesture, won the stalwarts to his side and got them to do his bidding in the mainstream media, where they’re dearly loved.
In the process, he could have proverbially dealt with three birds with one stone: softened the hostile ANC veterans (and by extension, the media that enjoys Zuma’s hostile constituencies), and by implication begun managing an increasingly hostile middle class, which is also increasingly extending across racial lines.
Zuma settled for the reactive third option - fighting fire with fire. Like a boxer in the ring, he retreated to his corner, KwaZulu-Natal, and then threw heavy punches from there. He adopted the proverbial soccer strategy - “the best form of defence is to attack”.
So, everyone who mattered on the Zuma criticism list faced the firing line: the opposition, media, “internal and foreign regime change agents”, former president Thabo Mbeki, and the critical ANC veterans.
Ironically, the fiercest onslaught was directed at the ANC’s stalwarts. This probably worked because it did take the sting out of the ANC veterans’ attacks, as manifested by the outcomes of the meetings between the veterans and the ANC’s National Working Committee, led by Zuma himself.
But Zuma’s reactive third option has serious shortcomings: the first and the biggest flaw is that it draws a bold line between the urban and rural areas. Not only did Zuma draw this bold line, but he subtly distanced himself from the urban constituencies, while expressing homeliness in rural KZN.
As if to dilute this KZN home retreat, Mpumalanga’s Bushbuckridge was thrown into the mix as an off-ramp. Essentially, by not confronting the middle-class, urban-based criticism, Zuma inadvertently disowned the urban constituency.
By virtue of being ANC president, he disowned his own urban ANC veteran constituency - and those that are influenced by these veterans. By virtue of being a state president, he disowned his own urban constituencies.
Perhaps the unintended consequence of defending himself in rural KZN against a predominantly urban-based criticism was that he feels alienated in urban constituencies.
Alternatively, the message was that he is not at his best within urban constituencies.
Thus, he needed to retreat to his familiar rural surroundings to address the very same urban constituency he is not comfor-table with.
In so doing, Zuma inadvertently may have entrenched the perception that the ANC is losing touch with urban constituencies.
The subtle message could be that Zuma distanced himself and the ANC from these urban “clever blacks”, their English press, and increasing judicial processes.
Compounding the situation, Zuma complicated the roles through which he was addressing his audience.
In some instances, it sounded like a personal defence speech. So, he would say, for example, “I am not scared of prison”. Or he would say, in reference to the letter from Mbeki, “how do you claim to be writing me a personal letter, while it’s all over the media”. These are strictly personal defensive positions.
Then, ironically, as if defending the ANC against criticism by ANC stalwarts, he argued “these people go to the press instead of structures of the ANC”. Here the gear has moved to the ANC.
Then he decries the government’s purported international sabotage because of its role in “steering Africa through Brics”. Suddenly he speaks as a state president.
Thus, he inadvertently created the impression of a man under siege, and in the process he would say anything in his defence. And that the best place to launch this defence is his rural background.
As a state president, and leader of the majority ruling party, Zuma should have the wisdom, capacity, ability and strength to address all organised dissenting constituencies wherever they may be.
He should deal directly with urban constituencies on their criticism of his ANC leadership and management of the state.
In fact, given the ANC’s loss of metros in recent elections, Zuma cannot afford to distance himself from urban constituencies. He needs to engage them.
Zuma cannot declare for himself urban critical constituencies as his own “no-go areas”. The consequences of such a personal strategy may, over time, be borne by the party he leads, the ANC.
Unless he engages and wins the hearts and minds of critical urban constituencies, he does risk turning the ANC into a rural party.
The biggest required strength of the leader of a ruling party is the ability to navigate various interests and constituencies within society towards a common direction.
* Hlophe is governance specialist at the Unisa School of Governance. He writes in his personal capacity.
** The views expressed here are not necessarily those of Independent Media.
The Sunday Independent