The $50 million daisy: Is Kenya's pyrethrum revival real?

Kyle Schutter's LinkedIn post about Kentegra Biotechnology's "$50 million success story" in pyrethrum processing caught my attention last week. Schutter, who runs Kenyan investment platform Kuzana, was celebrating what he called a "boring" company that deserved to be made "sexy again" after visiting their Naivasha facility.

But beneath the enthusiasm lies a story rich with historical baggage worth unpacking.

Dalmatian daisies 

Kentegra, a US company operating in Kenya, processes Chrysanthemum cinerariifolium - a modest daisy originally from Eastern Europe and Asia. The species arrived in Kenya via Japan in the early 1920s, introduced by European settlers who recognised the highland's potential for pyrethrum cultivation.

Kenya's Central Highlands, with their volcanic soils and cool temperatures, proved ideal for producing flowers rich in natural pyrethrins - the active compounds that make effective organic insecticides. 

Worth clarifying the terminology: pyrethrum is the crude flower extract, while pyrethrins are the six distinct insecticidal compounds within it. The pyrethrum provides the raw material; the pyrethrins do the actual work of disrupting insect nervous systems.

By the 1980s, Kenya dominated global pyrethrum production, supplying over 70% of the world's natural insecticide market. Some 300 000 farmers cultivated this crop across the highland regions, making pyrethrum a cornerstone of rural livelihoods.

Then came the collapse. As one LinkedIn commenter noted: "A crop once tightly controlled through a public body known as the Pyrethrum Board of Kenya, which not only failed farmers, but injected a layer of expensive bureaucracy in how the crop was marketed and utilised."

Another recalled how "Kenya had the largest pyrethrum factory in Nakuru, and farmers were doing very well, because of very good returns. However, it was killed by government officials through billing, and a lack of payment to farmers, or extended payment delays of over 6 to 12 months."

Indeed, the numbers tell the devastating story: farmer participation plummeted from 300 000 to roughly 6 000. Annual production crashed from 15 000 metric tonnes to less than 700. Kenya's pyrethrum earnings fell by over 40%.

Revival question

Enter Kentegra in the 2010s, promising revival. With $15 million in development finance from the US Development Finance Corporation and Finland's Finnfund, the company built a processing facility in Naivasha. Kentegra now claims to work with 90 000 farmers and has generated what Schutter characterises as "$50 million in revenue over 8 years."

The LinkedIn discussion following Schutter's post revealed both optimism and scepticism about the industry's prospects. One export consultant highlighted regulatory benefits: "[Pyrethrum] is approved by the EU, so that is a huge advantage for those in [the] export sector." Schutter responded that pyrethrum "is formulated in a few Kenyan products, which will be more common as the EU clamps down on non-organic insecticide in 2026."

But here's where the boring begins to intrigue, and where smart investors should start asking needling questions.

David vs. Goliath

Natural pyrethrum occupies roughly 3-7% of the global insecticide market, valued at around $291-670 million annually. Meanwhile, synthetic pyrethroids (chemical cousins derived from pyrethrum but engineered for stability and potency) command approximately $3.9-7.2 billion of the market.

The world's largest synthetic insecticide manufacturers aren't sitting idle. Syngenta alone spent $1.8 billion on R&D in 2024. Bayer invested $6.7 billion across its life sciences portfolio. These companies employ thousands of researchers developing new pest-control methods, biological products, and climate-resilient formulations. Their combined annual R&D spending exceeds $10 billion.

Against this backdrop, Kentegra's success, whilst admirable, raises fundamental questions about sustainability and scale. What are the actual margins on pyrethrum processing? Is demand genuinely market-driven, or artificially supported by organic certification premiums and development finance subsidies? 

Chemistry of competition

Synthetic pyrethroids exist precisely because natural pyrethrum has limitations. Whilst natural pyrethrins break down quickly in sunlight - a feature organic advocates celebrate for environmental safety - this rapid degradation limits their effectiveness for large-scale agricultural applications. Synthetic versions offer longer residual effects, greater photostability, and chemical consistency that allows standardised mass production.

The incentives for pyrethrum adoption centre on organic certification, resistance management (the complex mix of six natural esters makes insect resistance harder to develop), and environmental concerns about synthetic options. But these benefits must compete against agricultural economics, where cost-effectiveness and reliable supply chains often trump environmental concerns.

Questions worth asking

Before celebrating Kentegra as proof that "anything is possible in Kenya," discerning investors might want answers to several questions: What percentage of Kentegra's revenue comes from premium organic markets versus commodity insecticide sales? How do processing margins compare to synthetic options when development finance subsidies are removed? What happens to farmer participation when, not if, those subsidies end?

More broadly: Is the global organic insecticide market large enough to support multiple billion-dollar processors? Can natural pyrethrum compete economically against synthetic versions produced by companies spending billions on R&D?

The pyrethrum revival story is compelling precisely because it represents agricultural restoration rather than disruption. But restoration projects often require sustained external support to overcome the market forces that caused initial decline. 

No doubt, Kentegra appears to have built an impressive operation. Whether it can thrive in a market dominated by chemical giants with vastly superior resources and decades of R&D investment, well, that's the real test.

Schutter's enthusiasm for "boring" businesses is infectious. But the most boring thing (read interesting) about successful businesses is their ability to generate sustainable profits without external subsidies. That's the metric by which Kentegra's long-term impact will ultimately be measured.

Andile Masuku is Co-founder and Executive Producer at African Tech Roundup. Connect and engage with Andile on X (@MasukuAndile) and via LinkedIn.

*** The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of Independent Media or IOL.

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