Madlanga Commission: Avoiding Past Mistakes in the Pursuit of Truth

Clyde N.S. Ramalaine

The Madlanga Commission has been established as a constitutional mechanism of accountability, tasked with investigating the alleged infiltration of criminal syndicates into South Africa’s law enforcement and justice system.

On 17 September, with the testimony of KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Police Commissioner Lt. Gen. Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, the Commission entered the public phase of its work. It carries expectations of exposing corruption and political interference, threatening the integrity of policing and prosecutorial institutions.

Its first sitting, however, coincided with the uMkhonto we Sizwe Party’s (MKP) legal challenge seeking to invalidate the Commission,  which was struck off the roll on Thursday, September 18.

Beneath the veneer of transparency lies a structural paradox. The Commission’s powers, mandate, and composition demand scrutiny. While public hearings suggest openness, their non-binding mandate, reliance on a narrow cadre of “go-to” elite advocates such as Matthew Chaskalson and Terry Motau, who have been recycled through Marikana, State Capture, and other inquiries, and the exclusion of black legal formations, raise questions of credibility.

The dual role of Commissioner Sesi Baloyi further complicates independence. Moreover, the Commission offers no clarity on outcomes should the President be implicated. What is at stake is not only exposing infiltration but the credibility of institutional oversight in a political system where presidential discretion determines the weight of findings.

Does the Commission obscure rather than expose the truth? Its terms of reference restrict it to recommendations, leaving the President free to ignore them, even if implicated. Authority thus rests not on evidence or law but on political will. History cautions us: the Zondo and Seriti Commissions left many critical questions unanswered despite extensive inquiry.

The Terms of Reference

The Commission has been tasked with investigating the penetration of criminal syndicates into South Africa’s law enforcement and justice system. Its mandate covers infiltration within the SAPS, NPA, and judiciary, with expectations of recommending prosecutions, disciplinary action, and institutional reform. Yet, like many judicial commissions, its powers remain limited: it cannot issue binding findings. In a televised update, evidence leader Matthew Chaskalson admitted:

“All we can do is make recommendations to the president. Our recommendations don’t bind the president; it doesn’t bind the people in respect of whom we make those recommendations. The function of this body is to conduct a public hearing for the purpose of making recommendations; we don’t make binding findings.”[sic]

On the surface, this may appear as a technical clarification. In context, however, it is strikingly troubling.

The Nexus

At the heart of the controversy over the disbanding of the Political Killings Task Team (PKTT) lies a dual failure of accountability. First, the charge of political interference centres on the Minister’s overreach into operational policing, disregarding the constitutional separation between policy direction and execution, thereby undermining both security service autonomy and governance clarity. Second, Parliament, which should have checked such executive excesses, faltered: although Lt. Gen. Mkhwanazi testified he raised the matter before the Portfolio Sub-Committee, it was met with indifference and left unprioritised. This neglect exposes the structural weakness of parliamentary oversight, too often a procedural formality rather than a substantive mechanism of democratic accountability.

The President and the Recommendations

The constitutional design of the Madlanga Commission ensures that the ultimate arbiter of its outcomes, the President, remains politically invulnerable. Even if implicated, he retains discretion to sideline or discredit findings. The Seriti and Zondo Commissions illustrate this dynamic: politically sensitive figures benefited from structural safeguards, leaving accountability partial at best.

On Day 1, Lt. Gen. Mkhwanazi testified that Minister Senzo Mchunu, in dismantling the Political Killings Task Team (PKTT), indicated he had consulted President Ramaphosa. If the President was aware yet failed to ensure consultation with National Commissioner Fanie Masemola, it raises the troubling inference of negligence in safeguarding protocols. The implications are stark: if the highest office condones unilateral ministerial interference without oversight, executive accountability is fatally weakened.

How can a body whose findings carry no enforceable weight embody accountability? Its conclusions, however damning, remain toothless if the very office under scrutiny can ignore or manipulate them. This paradox reduces the process to a performance of accountability rather than a mechanism for justice.

Perceived Exclusion of Black Legal Formations

Another troubling dimension is the exclusion of black attorney formations. Organisations like PABASA, the BLA, and NADEL have voiced concern over being sidelined from the pool of evidence leaders. The BLA called this omission “shocking,” given the Commission’s mandate to probe systemic failures in the criminal justice system.

Justice Madlanga’s indifference, coupled with reliance on a familiar circle of elite advocates, underscores exclusion. Instead of broadening representation, the Commission concentrates influence within a narrow cadre, repeating patterns from prior inquiries. Commissioner Sesi Baloyi’s dual role as Commission member and President’s JSC representative further problematises its structure, raising conflicts of interest that compromise both perception and reality of independence.

Familiar Faces, Familiar Outcomes

The Commission’s legal team is led by Terry Motau, Matthew Chaskalson, Mahlape Sello, and others. Their repeated inclusion in high-profile commissions signals the recycling of establishment-aligned advocates. While their competence is not in question, the structural pattern transforms accountability into a politically safe exercise, shielding elites while appearing rigorous to the public.

Undisclosed Costs and Public Accountability

The Commission’s opacity extends to costs and the remuneration of evidence leaders. While R147 million is the touted budget, the actual details remain undisclosed. At the start of the Commission, its spokesperson, Jeremy Micheals, conceded that the six-month timeframe to which this budget is tailored will be exceeded. This has clear implications for cost overruns, and from the outset, I anticipated a time period between 18 and 24 months.

The PKTT and Political Interference

Established in 2018, the PKTT was a Cabinet-level initiative comprising an Inter-Ministerial Committee drawn from the security cluster ministries. It was chaired by the Minister of Police, administratively located within the Ministry of Police, yet operationally accountable to the National Police Commissioner. Mkhwanazi’s testimony revealed that Mchunu’s letter unilaterally disbanded the PKTT without requesting a briefing on its progress. This was also done without convening formal meetings, seeking input from the IMC, or consulting designated officials, constituting a clear breach of governance protocol.

Critical Recommendations

• Independent Appointments – Commissions must not be appointed solely by the President; parliamentary or judicial oversight is essential.
• Binding Powers – Recommendations must trigger automatic referral to prosecuting and disciplinary authorities.
• Financial Transparency – Advocate fees, staff contracts, and budgets must be disclosed publicly in real time.
• Inclusive Representation – Black attorneys and underrepresented voices must be structurally included to break elitist recycling.

The Madlanga Commission bears all the marks of performance, managing perception rather than confronting power. Its non-binding powers, recycled elite lawyers, exclusion of black legal formations, problematic human structures, and opaque costs render accountability optional and transparency selective.

Without independent, binding, transparent, and inclusive reforms, the Commission risks joining Seriti and Zondo as another costly illusion of accountability, where truth is obscured, power is shielded, and justice is deferred.

* Clyde N.S. Ramalaine is a theologian, political analyst, lifelong social and economic justice activist, published author, poet, and freelance writer.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.