International Criminal Court or Court of Chauvinism? Africa’s ordeal with the ICC

THE vision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) when it was established in 2002 was to be a turning point in the history of global justice, administering justice in a way no external force or power could influence.

It is an institution created to prosecute individuals for heinous crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression, serving as a neutral arbiter of international law. It is also to ensure that no one — regardless of power, geolocation or position — escapes accountability for atrocities.

Yet, over two decades later, its legitimacy and impartiality, particularly regarding Africa, remain questionable. So far, African leaders like Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, Côte d’Ivoire’s Laurent Gbagbo, and militia figures in the Democratic Republic of Congo have faced prosecution. Meanwhile, crimes by powerful nations like the US or the UK often go untouched.

As the African proverb goes, “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”. African nations feel trampled, seen as the grass beneath the feet of global powers.

Built by the Rome Statute, the ICC acts as a court of last resort, complementing national judicial systems when they are unwilling or unable to prosecute all manner of wrongdoings and has a mandate to foster global peace by deterring future crimes through impartial justice.

From the start, the ICC’s investigations centred on Africa, which created a visible pattern of focus in prosecutions. Looking at the following accounts, it all began with a referral in December 2003 from Uganda, targeting Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leaders like Joseph Kony for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including child soldier recruitment.

In pursuance of this case till now, only Dominic Ongwen was convicted and sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment back in 2021, and there are ongoing proceedings against Joseph Kony in absentia. Not long after that, in 2004, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) self-referred, resulting in cases against militia leaders like Thomas Lubanga, who was convicted in 2012 for child soldiers, and Bosco Ntaganda, sentenced to 30 years in 2019 for rape and murder.

That same year, the Central African Republic’s referral brought Jean-Pierre Bemba to trial, and he was acquitted in 2018 after a decade in detention. It didn’t end there.

In 2005, the UN Security Council sent Sudan’s Darfur crisis to the court, charging President Omar al-Bashir in 2009 with genocide, which was the first time in history a sitting leader faced such charges. He’s been detained in Sudan since 2023, but not handed over.

Many African countries were involved in similar hunts, including Kenya in 2010, where charges against Uhuru Kenyatta were dropped in 2015, Libya was also charged in 2011, with a warrant for their leader Muammar Gaddafi, who sadly died before trial. Côte d’Ivoire was also involved in 2011, when Laurent Gbagbo was convicted in 2021.

In addition, there were similar involvements in Mali in 2012, as well as in Burundi in 2017, which later left the court. Many of these cases came from African governments themselves or the UN Security Council, often because weaker national courts couldn’t handle the crimes or because leaders wanted to target opponents. But the fact that almost all the ICC’s cases involve African nationals has raised questions about why the court seems to pick on one continent.

While African cases moved forward quickly, crimes by powerful countries or their allies were often ignored or delayed. As another African proverb goes: “The one who holds the yam holds the knife.” The ICC, funded largely by Western countries, seems to wield its power unevenly, cutting at Africa while sparing others.

The ICC started looking at US actions in Afghanistan in 2006, but even after opening a case in 2020, it dropped focus on US crimes in 2021, saying it lacked resources, despite evidence of over 100 detainee deaths. The US pushed back, even to the extent of sanctioning ICC officials in 2020 and judges in 2025. This is a blatant attempt at influencing the powers of the court.

Again, a probe into UK actions in Iraq began in 2006 but ended in 2020 with no charges, relying on weak British investigations. Similarly, in Palestine, a 2021 case about Israeli bombings in Gaza (which, by the way, is still happening), which killed thousands, has seen no action by 2025, slowed by pressure from the U.S. and Israel. Yet when Russia invaded Ukraine, the ICC acted fast, issuing warrants for Vladimir Putin in 2023, backed by Western support.

Cases in Myanmar and Venezuela have moved more slowly. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International call this a double standard, where Western allies face less pressure while African cases dominate and are acted upon with speed.

This unbalanced focus and action sparked fierce criticism across Africa. Leaders and governments say the ICC treats them unfairly, acting like a neo-colonial power. The court’s mandate is to step in only when national courts fail, which happens more in developing countries with less advanced systems. But this doesn’t fully explain the pattern.

The African Union (AU), since 2009, has accused the court of targeting Africans, especially after al-Bashir’s case, arguing it hurt peace efforts. In 2013, the AU demanded the ICC stop prosecuting Kenya’s Kenyatta and William Ruto, saying it ignored African ways of resolving disputes and disrespected their sovereignty.

In response, Africa has sought its own solutions. In 2014, the AU proposed a new African Court to handle such crimes, though it’s not yet active. By 2016, the AU called for all African countries to leave the court’s founding treaty, the Rome Statute. This didn’t yield much result, but Burundi did so in 2017 after the ICC probed its violence.

South Africa and Gambia also considered following suit, but it has not yet materialised. Another complaint is that the ICC often charges rebel groups but spares government forces, even when groups like Human Rights Watch report state abuses in places like Uganda and Congo. So, in 2025, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger launched the Sahel International Court, a bold move to address war crimes, terrorism, and human rights abuses locally, rooted in African realities and free from Western influence.

This court, based in Bamako, aims to harmonise legal systems across the three nations, create a shared database of criminals, and build a high-security prison, signalling a rejection of the ICC’s perceived overreach. The ICC’s location in The Hague, a location in a faraway continent, and its funding from Western countries only deepen the sense that it’s a modern version of a colonial court, where Europeans judge Africans.

What other conclusion can be made aside from unbalanced justice and bias, when the ICC’s record reveals 47 of 54 people charged by 2024 are African, though Africa is just 27% of the court’s member countries? The court avoids cases against major powers like the US or China, which aren’t members, due to political complexities.

Serious cases like al-Bashir’s and Gaddafi’s felt to many Africans like Western moves to target leaders they opposed, not impartial justice. Citizens now see the ICC as a Western weapon. This sentiment is captured by the proverb that says: “The one who sweeps the room decides where the dust settles.” With the ICC’s Western funding and European base, many Africans see it as a colonial court, judging their leaders while sparing others.

Even former prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo couldn’t fully counter this when Sudan’s case exempted non-members like the US from scrutiny. The AU’s call for countries to leave the Rome Statute and the rise of courts like the 2025 Sahel International Court show a continent fed up. Africans want justice, but it must be fair, or they’ll forge their own path, guided by their own wisdom.

* Dr Manuel Godsin is a writer and researcher at the International Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. He obtained a doctorate in international relations and strategic affairs from the University of Bergen in Norway and a Master’s Degree in International Crisis Management from the University of Oslo.

** The views expressed do not reflect those of the Sunday Independent, Independent Media, or IOL.

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