David Lewis, the Competition Tribunal chairman, touched on, but did not discuss, an important aspect of the ability of the "small number of concentrated gorillas that the Independent Communication Authority of SA (Icasa) has to deal with" to undermine the authority of this regulatory body.
In his address to the Neotel/Mail & Guardian breakfast last week, Lewis discussed Icasa's unexpected last-minute attempt to block the Vodacom listing. At this juncture all of these gorillas must surely have realised the danger they faced in having an ill-functioning regulator such as Icasa.
Back in May each one of those unnamed gorillas - including Telkom, MTN, Cell C, Naspers and Communications Minister Siphiwe Nyanda - must have thought that at some stage in the future they too could be on the receiving end of Icasa's seemingly haphazard approach to its regulatory position. It is the sort of haphazard approach that results from years spent looking on helplessly as its authority was undermined by each of these powerful gorillas.
A research article published in 2007 by Robert Horwitz and Willie Currie, from the department of communication at the University of California-San Diego and the Association for Progressive Communications, respectively, certainly supports Lewis' concerns about the regulator's lack of independence.
The paper examines how Telkom's controlling shareholders were allowed to dictate the government's telecoms policy in the years after its privatisation.
It is possible that many of these corporate gorillas had access to a government minister or official who could be persuaded that the interests of the country would be better served by serving the interests of the gorilla rather than allowing Icasa the independence, which is enshrined in the constitution, to do what it deemed best.
As Lewis said, the Vodacom fiasco would never have happened in relation to the competition authorities.
"Our procedures and practices for deciding a merger are absolutely clear, as are the procedures and practices for appealing our decisions. We heard this merger and in this case, as in all cases, a panel of three decided on it.
"There is absolutely no way that the panel, much less a single member, could have reopened that inquiry or reversed the decision. And so no-one tried because our procedures and practices simply do not allow for this sort of thing to happen."
In addition, the competition authority makes its decisions in a transparent manner that "allows everyone to be heard in the making of the decision and is culturally immune to the sort of pressure that is exercised in the proverbial smoke-filled rooms".
Because of this there is considerably more certainty and transparency surrounding the activities of the competition authorities. And while this may occasionally disadvantage individual firms, it is hugely beneficial to the efficient workings of all the players in the economy, as well as consumer welfare.
Lewis believes that it is imperative that the jurisdictional difficulties that prevent the competition authorities from adjudicating on competition matters in the telecoms sector be resolved.
"The fact is that if there is a proven case for the benefits of competition in any sector, then it is in telecoms, which has a pervasive impact on the competitiveness of all firms and sectors. And the fact is that in South Africa our telecoms costs, fixed and mobile, remain among the highest in the world, our broadband penetration is pitiful and our service levels are unacceptable."
The tribunal chairman dismissed the argument that many of these problems would be solved by the entry of new competitors and technological innovation. He pointed out that the most important abuse of dominance cases in the US and EU over the past several years had involved technology innovators such as Microsoft and Intel.
These companies "having enjoyed the rents of their innovation, soon devote most of their energy to excluding innovative new technologies precisely because they threaten the rents of the incumbents".